Publications

/Publications
Publications 2019-12-19T17:48:20+00:00

Voici les publications (articles scientifiques et cahiers de recherche) liées à la mission de la Chaire:

“Long-Term Care Insurance: Information Frictions and Selection.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy (accepté pour publication 10-2019); avec Philippe De Donder, Claude Fluet, Marie-Louise Leroux, et Pierre-Carl Michaud https://ssrn.com/abstract=3075158.

“Demand for Annuities: Price Sensitivity, Risk Perceptions, and Knowledge.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organisations (accepté pour publication 03-2019); avec Pierre-Carl Michaud, et Sébastien Box-Couillard https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.022.

“A Canadian Parlor Room-Type Approach to the Long-Term Care Insurance Market.” Canadian Public Policy 45(2),  262–282 (2019); avec Philippe De Donder, Claude Fluet, Marie-Louise Leroux, et Pierre-Carl Michaud https://doi.org/10.3138/cpp.2018-023.

“Long-Term Care Risk Misperceptions.” Geneva Papers Issues and Practice 44(2): 183-215 (2019); avec Philippe DeDonder (UQAM), Marie-Louise Leroux (UQAM), Claude-Denys Fluet (Laval) et Pierre-Carl Michaud (HEC Montréal).

“If we can simulate it, we can insure it: An application to longevity risk management” Insurance: Mathematics and Economics 52: 35-45 (2013), Martin Boyer et Lars Stentoft (HEC Montréal and Copenhagen Business School).

“Yes we can (price derivatives on survivor indices)!”Risk Management and Insurance Review 20(1): 37-62 (2017), Martin Boyer et Lars Stentoft (Western University).

“Les modèles factoriels et la gestion du risque de longévité” Actualité Économique 91(4): 531-566 (2015), Martin Boyer, Christian Dorion (HEC Montréal) et Lars Stentoft (Western University).

“Measuring Longevity Risk for a Canadian Public Pension Fund” Risk Management and Insurance Review, 17(1): 37-59 (2014), Martin Boyer et Lars Stentoft (Western University, Copenhagen Business School) and Joanna Mezja (HEC Montréal).

“Pricing Survivor Forwards and Swaps in Incomplete Markets Using Simulation Techniques” In Longevity Risk Management for Institutional Investors (2012), Institutional Investors Journal (Fall 2012) pp. 69-87, Martin Boyer, Lars Stentoft (HEC Montréal, Copenhagen Business School) et Amélie Favaro (Mazars Frères).

“Insurance Fraud in a Rothschild-Stiglitz World.” Journal of Risk and Insurance (accepté pour publication 06-2018); avec Richard Peter (Iowa) https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12264 .

“Portfolio Rebalancing Behavior under Operating Losses and Investment Limitations.” International Review of Economics and Finance 63: 313-328 (2019); avec Willie D. Reddic (De Paul) et Elicia P. Cowins (Washington and Lee) https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2018.10.001.

“Insurers Complexity and Managerial Discretion.” Quarterly Journal of Finance 9(3):4 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1142/S2010139219500083; avec Willie D. Reddic (De Paul University) et Elijah Brewer III (De Paul University).

“Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance, Corporate Risk and Risk Taking:  New Panel Data Evidence on the Role of Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance.” Journal of Risk and Insurance 82(4): 753–791 (2015), Martin Boyer et Sharon Tennyson (Cornell).

“The Structure of Reinsurance Contracts” Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance: Issues and Practice 40: 474-492 (2015), Martin Boyer et Théodora Dupont-Courtade (Paris School of Economics).

“D&O Insurance and IPO Performance: what can we learn from insurers?” Journal of Financial Intermediation 23(4):504-540 (2014), Martin Boyer et Léa Stern (Syracuse University).

“Underwriting Apophenia and Cryptids: Are Cycles Statistical Figments of our Imagination?” Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance: Issues and Practice 40: 232-255 (2014), Martin Boyer et Iqbal Owadally (City University London).

“Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance and Shareholders’ Protection” Journal of Financial Perspective, 2(1): 107-128 (2014), Martin Boyer.

“Insuring Catastrophes and the Role of Governments” Natural Hazards and Earth Science Systems 13: 2053-2063 (2013)Martin Boyer et Charles Nyce (Florida State University).

“An Industrial Organization Theory of Risk Sharing” North American Actuarial Journal 17(4): 283-296 (2013), Martin Boyer et Charles Nyce (Florida State University). Lauréat du 2014 Brockett-Shapiro Best Paper Award

“Alleviating Managerial Disagreement through Financial Risk Management”. Quarterly Journal of Finance 3(2):9 (2013), Martin Boyer, Marcel Boyer (Université de Montréal) et René Garcia (EDHEC). Lauréat du 2013 QJF Best Paper Award

“Are Underwriting Cycles Real and Forecastable?” Journal of Risk and Insurance 79: 995–1015 (2012), Martin Boyer, Éric Jacquier (HEC Montréal, MIT) et Simon van Norden (HEC Montréal). Lauréat du 2012 Casualty Actuarial Society Best Paper Award on the Theory of Risk

“Is Corporate Governance Risk Valued? Evidence from Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance” Journal of Corporate Finance 18: 349-372 (2012), Martin Boyer et Léa Stern (Ohio State). Lauréat 2010 du Prix de la Banque du Canada du meilleur travail de recherche sur le système financier canadien

The Effect of Regulatory Constraints on Property and Casualty Insurers’ Investment Income (W. Reddic, S.P. Cowins). Envoyé au Journal of Regulatory Economics 05-2018, 08-2019 (R&R 04-2019)

Tax-Preferred Savings Vehicles: Can Financial Education Improve Asset Location Decisions? (P. d’Astous, P.-C. Michaud). Envoyé au Review of Economic and Statistics 10-2019.

Do Shareholders Care About Bribery? Revealing differing market reactions to employee and firm indictments for Foreign Corrupt Practices Act violations (K. Kordonsky). Envoyé au Journal of Business Ethics 11-2019

Directors’ Insurance and the Expected Cost of Frivolous Litigation when Cross-Listing into the United States (K. Kordonsky). Projet pour JCF 10-2020.

On the Use of Hierarchies to Complete Contracts when Players Have Limited Abilities: The Impact of Advanced Data Science on Insurance Organization (From Big Data to Big Bertha: The Impact of Data Analytics on an Insurer’s Organizational Structure when Agents Have Private Information and Limited Abilities). Projet pour JRU 06-2020.

A Model of Cyber Risk Management. Projet pour Management Science 12-2019.

Executive Compensation and Hedge Accounting: An Investigation of Reporting and Risk Incentives Limitations (W. Reddic, S.P. Cowins). Projet pour JAE 12-2019.

Electronic Sales Suppression Technology: The Billion Dollar Free Lunch (P. D’Astous). Projet pour JPE 09-2020.

System 1, System 2, and Speculative Trading (S. Ouzan). Projet pour RFS 09-2020

Electronic Sales Suppression Technology: The Billion Dollar Free Lunch (P. d’Astous). Projet pour JPE

The Market for Long-term Care Insurance in Canada. (Boyer, M., P. DeDonder, M-L Leroux, C-D Fluet, P-C. Michaud).

Earning Accruals in Complex Firms: The Case of Multi-Jurisdictional and Multi-Product Insurers (Boyer, M. et W. Reddic).

Do Insurers Deviate from the Industry Portfolio Asset Allocation Norm Under Investment Limitations? (Boyer, M. et W. Reddic).

Pensions, annuities, and long-term care insurance: On the impact of risk signaling (Boyer, M. et F. Glenzer).

Crowding out Long-Term Care Insurance through Social Security (Boyer, M. et F. Glenzer).

A Re-Examination of Adverse Selection Problems on the Annuity and Long-Term Care Insurance Markets (Boyer, M. et F. Glenzer).

EXEMPLE D’UN ARTICLE SCIENTIFIQUE

Tax-Preferred Savings Vehicles: Can Financial Education Improve Asset Location Decisions? (M. M. Boyer, P. d’Astous et P.-C. Michaud)

Nous utilisons la méthode du choix exprimé pour analyser la décision de contribuer à des comptes d’épargne à impôt différé, taxés à l’entrée ou à la sortie. Notre plan expérimental comprend un traitement à assignation aléatoire en matière d’éducation financière, qui fournit aux répondants de l’information sur chacun des types de comptes. Les répondants qui ont été exposés à l’intervention connaissent mieux ces véhicules et font des choix de cotisation qui augmentent leur revenu et leur bien-être après impôt, du moins par rapport à un point de référence bien défini. Comparé à un groupe témoin, l’effet moyen du traitement sur les traités se traduit par une augmentation du bien-être moyen des répondants de près de 40% du montant de la contribution initiale.